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NON-TECHNICAL SUMMARY
Changes in international regulation affecting several economically interlinked countries lead
to questions about their long-term impacts.  These issues are the matter of debates currently
taking place in the European Union.  A specific question that arises is whether regulation,
such as minimum standards concerning product quality, contributes to regional economic
convergence or rather supports further divergence.  At this time, there is no general agreement
on the impact of such regulation on the process of European economic integration.  The
differences in opinion are often due to different assessments of the medium- and long-term
effects of such standards.  Currently, the Country-of-Origin principle (i.e., mutual recognition
of national minimum quality standards) is prevalent within the EU as the main alternative to
national (destination-oriented) treatment of product standards.  This gives rise to questions
about the dynamic effects of such a standard arrangement.  In particular, will an initial quality
difference in the presence of adjustment costs lead to divergence of regional welfares in future
periods?  Given these dynamic effects, how will quality standards affect future outcomes?
This paper analyzes these questions using a two-country model of imperfect competition.  The
analysis captures some of the most important aspects of European markets.  National
industries bear quality-dependent product development costs, choose different quality levels,
and compete by setting prices in two segmented national markets.  Trade takes place, since
both industries are present in both markets.  Since increased differentiation in terms of quality
decreases competition between rival products, higher quality products will coexist with lower
quality products, even if all firms were identical.  However, in the presence of technological
differences, high-quality products will normally be provided by national industries with low
product development costs.  Without regulation, equilibrium qualities and prices will not be
optimal due to imperfect competition
The static one-period analysis without regulation and with quality standards demonstrates that
standards achieve initial convergence in terms of product qualities produced and national
welfares.  However, it is of interest to know whether convergence continues during future
periods when firms have to bear costs of adjusting quality beyond the past level of quality
offered.  Considering that one national industry offers a higher quality than its international
competition from the beginning, will this industry not increase its lead with each passing
period?  Extending the one-period analysis to multiple periods, where firms' product qualities
in the previous period determine their costs, basically confirms the convergence results.
The analysis presented here suggests that minimum quality standards applied according to the
Country-of-Origin principle may speed up regional convergence by supporting those industries
that provided products of lower quality in the past.  In addition, standards might speed up
technological development in all industries.  Both effects would lead to welfare gains in all
countries.  In the long run, the lagging industries could even be better off in terms of profits
than without regulation.  However, for an intermediate period of time, standards would imply
very high additional costs for those industries.
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1Mutual Recognition of National Minimum Quality Standards May Support International
Convergence
1.  Introduction
At this time, there is no general agreement on the best way to achieve European economic
integration.  In particular, support for the harmonization of standards, especially minimum
standards concerning product quality, safety, or environmental protection, varies considerably
within the EU.  The differences in opinion are often due to different assessments of the
medium- and long-term effects of such standards.  Currently, the Country-of-Origin principle
(i.e., mutual recognition of national minimum quality standards) is prevalent within the EU as
the main alternative to national (destination-oriented) treatment of product standards.1  This
gives rise to questions about the dynamic effects of such a standard arrangement.  In
particular, will an initial quality difference in the presence of adjustment costs lead to
divergence of national welfares in future periods?  Given these dynamic effects, how will
quality standards affect future outcomes?  In this paper, we will analyze these questions within
a framework of vertical product differentiation
To analyze the questions raised above, I employ a two-country version of a model of vertical
product differentiation that includes simultaneous standard-setting by governments when two-
way trade occurs.  The model describes a static three-stage game in standards, qualities and
prices.  Dynamics are introduced by repeating the one-shot game and assuming that firms have
to bear adjustment costs that are increasing with the quality change but independent of quality
in the previous period.
2In both the fields of industrial organization and of international trade, there are fairly large
bodies of literature focusing on models of vertical product differentiation.  The basic features
of these models have been well known for some time.  Gabszewicz and Thisse (1979)
developed a framework for quality preferences where consumers with identical tastes but
different income levels demand different quality levels.  They analyzed the Cournot-duopoly
equilibrium and showed its dependence on the income distribution and quality parameters.
Shaked and Sutton (1982) showed that in the case of duopolists that first choose quality and
then compete in price, the equilibrium will include both firms entering with distinct quality
levels enjoying positive profits, i.e., they demonstrated how quality differences relax price
competition.  Ronnen (1991) uses Shaked and Sutton’s framework to demonstrate cases
where quality standards improve welfare.  He concludes that there exists a binding minimum
quality standard such that all consumers are weakly better off, both firms have positive
profits, and total welfare is increased.  As a result of such a standard, profits of the high-
quality provider must fall, whereas profits of the low-quality provider may even rise if the
standard is set close to the equilibrium level of low quality without regulation.2  But since
there is only one market, the analysis of the case of Mutual Recognition is not possible and
there is no scope for a welfare analysis in the presence of more than one regulating
government.  Motta and Thisse (1994) analyze uniform minimum quality standards in a single
market using a model formally similar to Ronnen and explicitly derive equilibrium qualities.
They reinterpret quality as "environmental quality" and derive results comparable to Ronnen's.
Crampes and Hollander (1995) present a study where quality improvements fall on variable
costs.  They present results where all consumers lose through the imposition of a standard,
contrary to Ronnen or Motta and Thisse. However, this literature is still limited to the analysis
of uniform standards in a single market.  Similarly, the earlier literature lacks the elements of
two-way trade and strategic interaction of governments.3  Only recently has the existing
3analysis been extended to include these features.  Boom (1995) introduces National Treatment
of standards into a two-country model.  Contrary to Ronnen or Motta and Thisse, a relatively
high standard imposed in one country can lead to market exit and a reduction of product
variety in one country reducing consumers' welfare.  But to our knowledge, none of this
literature covers Mutual Recognition.4
The static one-shot game presented in this paper represents a two-country extension of the
framework of Shaked/Sutton and Ronnen, i.e., it is a partial-equilibrium model of vertical
product differentiation and trade in which duopolistic firms face quality-dependent
development costs and compete in quality and price in two segmented markets.  We present a
comparison between market outcomes in the absence of regulation and under Mutual
Recognition abstracting from differences in technology, national demand and market size.
This allows for a clearer exposition of the effects of standards.5  The principal model applied
has been forwarded previously in Lutz (1996b, 2000).
As in Ronnen, the effects of quality standards on industry competition are primarily driven by
their influence on price competition and the qualities produced.  Due to the duopoly situation
and the nature of price and quality competition, an unregulated equilibrium results  in
qualities being too low, prices being too high and quality differentiation being too low when
compared to a welfare-maximizing solution.  When qualities produced become more similar,
price competition intensifies.  In response to quality standards,  qualities rise, quality
differentiation is reduced, and prices adjusted for quality fall.  In the case of a single standard,
only the low-quality provider is constrained.  High quality rises also because qualities are
strategic complements due to the effect of quality differentiation on price competition.
Reduced quality differentiation results because increasing quality is increasingly costly.
4Under Mutual Recognition, each government maximizes national welfare subject to its own
standard.  Now both firms face binding standards and are forced to increase quality.  This
leads to a higher degree of product differentiation than with a single standard.  However, since
costs are convex in quality, the government regulating the low-quality provider prefers to
increase its industry's quality more than the other government.  Therefore, quality
differentiation is lower than without regulation.  In addition, each country benefits from an
increase in quality of the other country's product.  The results of the static one-shot game
without regulation and with quality standards suggest that standards achieve initial
convergence in terms of qualities produced and national welfares.  Introducing quality
standards will increase both qualities, reduce the ratio of qualities, reduce both national
industries' profits, increase national welfare in both countries, and reduce the ratio of national
welfares.
However, it is of interest to know whether convergence continues during future periods when
firms have to bear costs of adjusting quality beyond the past level of quality offered.
Considering that one firm offers a higher quality than its competitor from the beginning, will
this firm not increase its lead with each passing period?  In other words, will an initial quality
difference in the presence of adjustment costs lead to divergence of national welfares in future
periods?  Furthermore, given these dynamic effects, how will quality standards affect future
outcomes?
As mentioned earlier, effects of standards under Mutual Recognition have not been analyzed
in the literature, even for the one-shot game.  But the question whether an initial quality
advantage will persist over time has been treated in the context of two-period models of
vertical product differentiation.   Motta, Thisse and Cabrales (1995) investigate whether the
5opening of trade will lead to persistence of an initial quality leadership caused by national
differences in demand.  Countries operate under autarchy in the first period, whereas trade
occurs in the second.  They conclude that persistence of leadership is most likely to result.
This is the only possible outcome if differences in national demand are very large.   In all
other cases, i.e. when multiple equilibria exist, using the risk dominance criterion leads to the
selection of the persistence-of-leadership outcome.  Similarly, other studies using two-period
models focus on the effects of trade liberalization or market integration occurring at a specific
date.  The effects of regulation occurring over several periods is typically not analyzed.6
Extending the one-shot game to multiple periods, where the static game is repeated each
period and firms' qualities in the previous period determine their costs, basically confirms the
convergence results.  In an N-period game, quality standards will lead to convergence in terms
of qualities and national welfares.  Without standards, national welfares will diverge over time
even though quality differentiation stays constant.  It is noteworthy that the ratio of national
welfares first rises for a few periods before further convergence is achieved.  This indicates
that there is a nontrivial difference between two-period and N-period extensions of this game.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 presents the model, market
equilibria without minimum quality standards, and market equilibria with minimum quality
standards.  Dynamic behavior in the presence of adjustment costs is analyzed in Section 3.
Main conclusions are presented in Section 4.
62.  The Model in the Absence of Standards
2.1.  Basics
In this section we present a two-market, partial-equilibrium model of vertical product
differentiation.  The model describes a two-stage game with firms interacting simultaneously
in both stages.  To derive solutions, I will use the concept of subgame-perfect equilibrium,
computing the solutions for each stage in reverse order.  There are two separate countries, the
"domestic country" (D) and the "foreign country" (F).  Markets (and demands) in both
countries are segmented but identical.  There are two firms, the "domestic firm" (d) is located
in the domestic country and the "foreign firm" (f) is located in the foreign country.  The two
firms produce distinct goods, sold at prices pd and pf, respectively.  The two products carry a
single quality attribute denoted by sd and sf, respectively.  Either firm faces costs of quality
development.  There are no unit costs of production.  Quality development costs are identical
for both firms and take the form of increasing, convex (quadratic) functions of quality, the
exact level of which depending on quality chosen and a quality cost parameter b.  Total costs
of firm i are then:
ci = b si2 (1)
In each market, there is a continuum of consumers distributed uniformly over the interval [0,
t] with unit density, where t  1.  Each consumer purchases at most one unit of either firm d's
product or firm f's product.  The higher consumer i's income parameter ti, the higher is her
(his) reservation price.  Consumer i's utility is given by equation (2) if good j is purchased.
Consumers who do not purchase receive zero utility.7
uti = sj ti - pj (2)
Firms d and f play a two-stage game.  In the first stage, firms determine qualities to be
produced and incur costs ci (i = d, f).  In the second stage, firms choose prices simultaneously.
Note that both firms choose their respective product quality from the same interval [0, ).
7This also means that both firms' choice whether to be the low-quality or the high-quality
provider is now endogenous.  The resulting market equilibria will include some consumers in
the lower segment of the interval [0, t] not valuing quality enough to even buy from the low-
quality provider.8  Because the markets are segmented and demands are identical across
countries, each firm's profits are identical across countries.  It follows also that consumer
surplus is the same across countries.  This greatly simplifies the following analysis and allows
for dropping national indices when deriving the main model components.
2.2.  Price Competition
To solve the game, consider first the demand faced by the high-quality and low-quality
provider in each market, respectively.  Let h and o stand for high and low quality, respectively.
These demands are then given by:
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Let th = (ph - po)/(sh - so) and to = po/so.  Consumers with ti = po/so will be indifferent
between buying the low-quality product and not buying at all.  Consumers with ti = (ph -
po)/(sh - so) will be indifferent between buying either the high-quality or low-quality the
product.  Consumers with t  ti > th will buy high quality, consumers with th > ti > to will buy
low quality, and consumers with ti < po/so will  not buy at all.
Let i = h, o; let j  i.  The profit function for firm i is given by piqi(pi,pj,si,sj) - ci(si).  Taken
both qualities as given, the price reaction functions in each market are given as the solutions to
8the first order conditions.  Solving the resulting equations for both prices, equilibrium prices
are then given as:
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Note that for all sh > so, t > th > to > 0 will hold, i.e., equation (4) is in fact an unconstrained
price equilibrium.
Given the price equilibrium depicted above, demands and thus profits can be expressed in
terms of qualities.  For positive qualities si (i = h, o), these profit functions are:
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2.3.  Market Equilibria Without Quality Standards
To derive the firms' quality best responses, we investigate each firm's profit function, given
the other firm's quality choice, and taking into account the behavior in the price-setting
subgame.  Since the choice of high or low quality as compared to the competitor is
endogenous, a firm's profit function will be a composite function, consisting of a segment
where low quality is chosen and another segment where high quality is chosen.  Firm i's profit
as a function of own quality, si, is then given by:
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The properties of the national revenue functions used to derive results are presented in the
appendix.  The economic content of these properties lies in the effects that quality choice has
on price competition and marginal costs.  These properties are used to establish the shape of
the profit function which, in turn, allows for the derivation of firm i's quality best response.
For any strictly positive quality chosen by the competitor, a firm can choose either a higher or
a lower level of quality.  The closer the two qualities are, however, the more are profits
curtailed by price competition.  If both qualities are identical, price equals marginal cost and
profit is negative.  This implies that an increase in the competitor's quality increases maximum
profit in the low-quality segment while decreasing maximum profit in the high-quality
segment.  Redefine PIh and PIo as the expressions in the first and second line of the right hand
side (RHS) of equation (6), respectively.    Lemma 1 describes the shape of firm i's profit
function taking the competitor's quality as given.  It also describes the change in local profit
maxima when the competitor's quality changes Proofs of the results presented in Lemma 1
through Lemma 3 are shown in the appendix.9
Lemma 1.  Firm i's profit as a function of own quality si consists of two strictly concave
segments, the low-quality segment PIo and the high-quality segment PIh, connected at si = sj
(where sj is the competitor's quality).  Each of these segments has a unique local maximum,
say PIomax and PIhmax for the low and the high-quality segment, respectively.  As sj
approaches zero, PIhmax - PIomax approaches a positive limit.  For any sj, an increase in sj
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will decrease  PIhmax - PIomax.  There exists a unique switchpoint sj* = (sj | PIhmax -
PIomax = 0).  At sj*, both local profit maxima are positive.
Lemma 1 implies that firm i will earn higher profits as the high-quality provider for sj between
zero and the switchpoint sj*, while earning higher profits as the low-quality provider for sj >
sj*.  Hence, firm i's switchpoint is that level of firm j's quality where firm i is indifferent
between being the high-quality and the low-quality provider.  Profits along firm i's quality best
response are decreasing in sj for sj < sj*, increasing in sj for sj > sj*, and attain a minimum at
the switchpoint.   In the absence of fixed costs , profits along firm i's quality best response are
strictly positive for any sj > 0.  If sj was to change from sj* -  to sj* + , firm i would switch
from being the high-quality provider to being the low-quality provider.  Hence, we can derive
the shape of firm i's quality best response.  This is done in Lemma 2.
Lemma 2.  a) Firm i's quality best response consists of two segments satisfying the following
conditions.  For 0  sj < sj*, firm i provides high quality.  For sj > sj*, firm i provides low
quality.  At s1 = sj*, firm i is indifferent between providing high or low quality.  Profits along
firm i's quality best response are decreasing in sj for sj < sj*, increasing in sj for sj > sj*, and
attain a minimum at the switchpoint.
b) Firm i's quality best response is strictly increasing in sj for all sj  sj*.
c) Firm i's quality best response is strictly decreasing in b.
The market equilibria in pure strategies without government intervention are simply given by
the intersections of the quality best responses.  Generally, there will be two pure-strategy
equilibria as long as firms are identical or not too different with respect to cost of providing
quality.10  This is illustrated in Figure 1.  The ratio of high quality to low quality, sh/so, is
11
constant with respect to market size t and cost parameter b.  Equilibrium qualities can be
calculated as multiples of t2/b.  If firms 'cost parameters are different, then equilibrium
qualities can be calculated as multiples of t2/bh. for any given ratio bo/bh.  In this case, sh/so
increases monotonically in bo/bh.
Insert FIGURE 1 about here
Consumer surplus for each equilibrium can be expressed in the following way:
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Country I's welfare, WI, is just the sum of national consumer surplus and the profit of the firm
located in that country.  Total welfare, W, is then the sum of the welfare in both countries.
Although welfare can only be calculated after determining which firm provides high quality
and which provides low quality, some welfare results can be obtained that hold in either
quality equilibrium.  The qualities chosen in an unregulated equilibrium will generally not be
optimal from the point of view of either government, since each government prefers higher
quality levels than those chosen in a market equilibrium.  The properties of consumer surplus
in either country necessary to derive these results are shown in the appendix.  In both
countries, an increase of either quality will lead to increases of consumer surplus at increasing
rates.  This leads to the result in Lemma 3.
Lemma 3.  a) Given an unregulated quality equilibrium, national welfare of both countries
can be increased by increasing either or both qualities.
           b) There exists a single standard that, if imposed in both countries, would increase
welfare of both countries.
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In the following section, we extend the model introduced above to include the interaction of
governments that use minimum quality standards as optimizing policy instruments.  The two-
stage industry game is preceded by a government stage where standards are set that will be
constraints for the subsequent industry game.
2.4.  Market Equilibria With Quality Standards
Under the standard-setting procedure of Mutual Recognition, governments noncooperatively
set producer standards for their respective firms and recognize the adequacy of each other's
standard.11  The two-stage industry game is now preceded by a stage where governments set
their respective standards simultaneously.  Each government maximizes national welfare with
respect to a minimum quality standard, taking the other government's standard as given.  Both
firms will face binding standards.  This means that each government maximizes national
welfare with respect to its own firm's quality subject to nonnegative profits to derive the
national standard best response.  It also implies that the high-quality provider has no
possibility to preempt entry by the low-quality provider.  Differentiating country I's objective
function with respect to si yields equation (8).
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At the unregulated equilibrium, the RHS of equation (8) is positive for both countries since
marginal consumer surplus is positive.12  However, as si is increased this change diminishes
and eventually becomes negative.  In fact, it can be shown that, under our assumptions, each
country's objective function either has a single maximum at which it is locally strictly concave
or has a maximum where profits of the local firm just equal zero.13  It follows, that both
national governments have an incentive to set a binding minimum quality for their respective
13
firm.  In effect, either firm's quality is now set by its government.  This means also, that the
governments' standard best responses (to each other's standards) are of the same general shape
as firms' quality best responses (illustrated in Figure 1).14
We are now in the position to compare results.  The results of the static one-shot game without
regulation and with quality standards are shown in the first rows (Period 0) of Tables 1 and 2,
respectively.  Introducing quality standards will increase both qualities and national welfare in
both countries.  Since low quality is increased overproportionally, the ratio of qualities falls
from about 5.2 to about 3.2 and the ratio of national welfares falls from about 2 to about 1.4.
Welfare in the country hosting the low-quality provider increases by about 50%, whereas
welfare in the other country increases only marginally.  Both national industries' profits
decrease.  It is noteworthy that the low-quality provider's profits are driven to zero.  This
means that regulation in that country is constrained by its industry's lower profit opportunities.
In summary, initial convergence in terms of qualities produced and national welfares is
achieved.  The next section extends the analysis to multiple periods and introduces adjustment
costs into the model.
3. Dynamic Behavior with Adjustment Costs15
As we have seen in the previous section, static analysis suggests that quality standards lead to
convergence.  This result can be applied straightforwardly to a multiple-period setting with
finite time horizon where firms have to incur costs of quality each period new. In this case, the
subgame-perfect equilibrium of the static game forms the solution for each period in the
dynamic game.  But since both firms start from the same initial positions each period, the pair
of chosen qualities will be identical for all periods, i.e. neither divergence nor convergence
will occur over time.16  It is more realistic to assume that firms face adjustment costs of
14
changing product quality relative to last period's quality.  In this case, providing a given level
of quality this period will be cheaper for the firm that provided higher quality in the previous
period.17  This gives a cost advantage to the firm with the higher quality last period.  We
assume adjustment costs to contribute to divergence, ceteris paribus, since cumulative cost
advantages of the high-quality provider are carried over from period to period.  Knowledge
spillovers18 would tend to reduce this cost advantage.  The following focuses on the dynamic
effects of  these adjustment costs abstracting from knowledge spillovers.
In the N-period repeated game, quality development costs are now quadratic functions of the
difference of qualities in the current period  and the previous period -1.  Total costs of firm i
are then:
ci = b (si, - si,-1)2 (9)
Costs are independent of initial quality.  This implies that there is no a priori bias in favor of
the high- or low-quality provider.  Firms, consumers, and governments are assumed to have
full information and to discount future periods completely.19 This means that in each period,
firms will maximize current-period profits only. However, since qualities will change from
period to period, the maximization problem of each firm changes over time.
The results for ten periods are reported in Figures 2 and 3 and Tables 1 and 2.  Please note that
these are not simulations but analytical results generally valid for any combination of market
size t and cost parameter b. Without quality standards, qualities, profits and consumer surplus
steadily increase from period to period.  The ratio of qualities stays constant since adjustment
costs are independent of initial quality.  However, national welfares tend to diverge since
profits of the high-quality provider increase much faster than those of the low-quality
15
provider.  The high-quality provider profits more from a high degree of product differentiation
than the low-quality provider.
Insert TABLES 1 & 2 ( together!) and FIGURES 2 & 3 (together!) about here
A comparison of the results in Tables 1 and 2 shows that minimum quality standards
accelerate the growth of qualities and national welfares.  With quality standards, the ratio of
qualities steadily decreases over time.  The ratio of national welfares decreases steadily after
two periods of increases.  The initial divergence of national welfares is due to the low-quality
provider's nonnegative-profit constraint being binding in these periods.  This leads to the
setting of lower standards for this firm, implying relatively low quality levels and a relatively
high degree of quality differentiation.  It also means that the low-quality provider initially
bears a very high cost of being regulated.  Regulation reduces profits of the low-quality
provider in the first three periods, but increases profits thereafter.  The high-quality provider
faces reduced profits due to regulation for all periods.  This long-run effect on profits is
reminiscent of Ronnen's result with respect to a single standard, where profits of the low-
quality provider might be increased whereas profits of the high-quality provider are reduced
by an appropriately chosen standard.  The underlying intuition carries over to our results and
lies in regulation giving the low-quality provider a means of committing to higher quality.
4.  Conclusions
Changes in international regulation affecting several economically interlinked countries lead to
questions about their long-term impacts.  These issues are the matter of debates currently
taking place in the European Union.  A specific question that arises is whether regulation, such
16
as quality standards, contributes to national economic convergence or rather supports further
divergence.  Our analysis suggests that minimum quality standards applied according to the
Country-of-Origin principle may speed up national convergence by supporting those industries
that provided products of lower quality in the past.  In addition, standards might speed up
technological development in all industries.  Both effects would lead to welfare gains in all
countries.  In the long run, the lagging industries could even be better off in terms of profits
than without regulation.  However, for an intermediate period of time, standards would imply
very high additional costs for those industries.
While this is only a very specific attempt to analyze dynamic issues by extending a static
model of vertical product differentiation to include multiple periods, it is nevertheless a step
towards closing the gap between static and dynamic analysis in this field.  Due to the
simplicity of the model, the effects of standards could be clearly demonstrated.  The cost
specification leads to a natural benchmark where without regulation the ratio of qualities
produced stays constant over time.  The results demonstrate that while the choice of multiple
periods rather than just two is nontrivial, the precise number of periods does not change the
qualitative results of the analysis.  Furthermore, the qualitative results are maintained for cases
where firms have different cost functions.
On the other hand, the simplicity of the model implies that this analysis is yet incomplete.  It is
of interest to investigate the effects of asymmetries in national demand.  A priori, we assume a
larger national market or a higher willingness to pay by consumers to lead to higher standards
imposed on the industry residing in this country.  Since it is likely that the country with the
greater demand for quality will host the high-quality provider, this will certainly weaken the
case for convergence.
17
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Appendix
(All calculations are available upon request.)
Properties of the Revenue Functions
Let Rt and MRt denote firm i's national revenue and marginal revenue functions, respectively,
where t = h, o specifies whether firm i is the provides high or low quality.  The other firm's
quality is denoted by sj.
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First-Order Conditions and Slopes of Firms' Quality Best Responses
The first order conditions for the high and low quality branches of firms' quality best
responses are given as:
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The slopes of the high and low quality branches of firms' quality best responses are given as:
ds
ds
(8t s s (5s s )) / (256b s 256b s s
40t s s 96b s s 8t s 16b s s b s ) 0
i
j
h
2
i j i j i i
4
i i
3
j
2
i j
2
i i
2
j
2 2
j
3
i i j
3
i j
4
   
    
 (A.4a)
ds
ds
(2t s s (7s 8s )) / (b s 16b s s 1 t s s
96b s s 1 t s 256b s s 256b s ) 0
i
j
o
2
i j i j i i
4
i i
3
j
2
i j
2
i i
2
j
2 2
j
3
i i j
3
i j
4
    
   
4
6
(A.4b)
Both slopes are positive, but less than one.
Proof of Lemma 1
The concavity properties of the profit function in equation (6) follow from concavity of
revenues, since costs are convex.  Revenues are concave by equations (A.1a), (A.1b), (A.2a)
and (A.2b).  The first-order conditions for local maxima are shown in equations (A.3a) and
(A.3b).  As sj approaches zero, PIomax approaches profits at si = sj = 0 equaling 0, whereas
PIhmax approaches the monopoly profits.  By equations (A.1c) and (A.1d), PIhmax decreases
and PIomax increases as sj increases.  QED
Proof of Lemma 2
a) By Lemma 1, for firm i, (PIhmax - PIomax) > 0 for sj < sj*, (PIomax - PIhmax) > 0 for sj >
sj*, and PIhmax - PIomax = 0 for sj = sj*.  By inequalities (A.1c) and (A.1d), PIhmax
decreases and PIomax increases as sj increases.  QED
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b) At firm i's quality best response, marginal revenue (of quality si) equals marginal cost.  An
increase in sj increases marginal revenue while leaving marginal cost unchanged.  Increasing
si will decrease marginal revenue while increasing marginal cost until marginal revenue
equals marginal cost again. See equation (1) and inequalities (A.2a) through (A.2d).  The first
order conditions for the quality best responses and the resulting slope expressions are shown
in equations (A.3) and (A.4).  QED
c) Starting at firm i's quality best response, an increase in bi increases marginal cost while
leaving marginal revenue unchanged.  Decreasing si will increase marginal revenue while
decreasing marginal cost until marginal revenue equals marginal cost again.  QED
Proof of Lemma 3
a) For any pair of qualities chosen in a market equilibrium, marginal profits of both firms are
zero, whereas marginal consumer surplus in both countries with respect to both qualities is
positive.  In addition, an increase in high quality will increase low-quality profit and an
increase in low quality will decrease high-quality profit less than consumer surplus increases,
i.e. CSI/so + PIh/so > 0.  See equations (A.1c), (A.1d), (A.5a) through (A.5e) and note
that by equation (A.1b), so < 4sh/7 is a necessary condition for low-quality marginal profits to
be equal to zero.  QED
b) If a standard were set slightly above low quality in the unregulated equilibrium, it would be
binding for the low-quality provider, but not for the high-quality provider.  Since by equation
(A.3a), the high-quality provider's quality best response is increasing in low quality, both
qualities will increase.  The welfare result follows then from part a).  QED
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Properties of the Consumer Surplus Functions
Let CSI (I = D, F) denote country I's consumer surplus function.  Firms' qualities are denoted
by sh and so for high  and low quality, respectively.
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Notes
                                                          
1 Full Harmonization, the main goal until the late 1970s, will be constrained to essential safety and
health requirements.  In all other cases, as a rule Mutual Recognition of national standards applies.
As an exception, National Treatment (NT) can be applied in certain cases governed by the EEC Treaty
Articles 100 and 36.  The differences between the three arrangements are best illustrated using an
example.  Suppose a French and a German manufacturer of household appliances are selling their
products in both national markets.  Under FH, one standard set by the EU Council of Ministers applies
in both countries.  Under MR, German products are governed by German standards even if they are
sold in France and French products need only meet French standards even if they are sold in Germany
(the country-of-origin principle).  Under NT, German standards must be met by all products sold in
Germany including the French products while French standards must be met by all products sold in
France including the German products.
2 Ronnen starts from the assumption that the chosen order of qualities is already determined, i.e. it is a
priori clear which of the firms offers the higher quality.  Consequently, Ronnen analyzed firms quality
best responses only in the vicinity of one existing equilibrium.  However, with completely endogenous
choice of quality, there exist up to two equilibria and each firm's quality best response is
discontinuous and contains a high- and a low-quality branch, respectively.  In our paper, we
demonstrate the derivation of complete quality best responses and the resulting equilibria.  These
equilibria are in pure strategies.  If there are two pure-strategy equilibria, there also exists at least one
mixed-strategy equilibrium.  However, the analysis of mixed-strategy equilibria is beyond the scope of
this work.  The emergence of multiple equilibria has also been acknowledged by, e.g., Boom (1995) or
Crampes/ Hollander (1995).  The  question of selection between two asymmetric equilibria was
recently addressed by Motta/Thisse/Cabrales (1997) who demonstrate how the risk dominance
criterion can be utilized for this purpose in models of the type employed here.
3 See, e.g., Leland (1979), Shapiro (1983), Besanko/Donnenfeld/White (1988) and  Das/Donnenfeld
(1989).
4 In addition, these studies have generally neglected the possibility that a standard may give firms
providing high quality the ability to deter entry by potential suppliers of lower qualities.
5 Assuming identical technologies and markets leads to multiple equilibria in  our model, so that we
cannot identify which country will initially host the high-quality producer and have the higher
welfare.  However, the emergence of quality leadership arising from national differences in demand or
technology has been demonstrated elsewhere.  See, e.g., Motta/Thisse/Cabrales (1997).
6 See , e.g., Barros/Martinez-Giralt (1999) and Motta (1992).
7 For the derivation of utility and demand see, e.g., Tirole (1988, pp. 96, 97).
8 This guarantees an interior solution of the price game.  If the distribution of consumers would not
cover the entire interval [0, t], but were instead of the form covering the interval [t-1, t], then this
would not necessarily be true.  If t were large, the firms would cover the whole market.  However,
including this case would not change the qualitative results to be obtained.
9 Proofs of the results presented in Lemma 1 through Lemma 3 are shown in the appendix.
10 The existence of a unique quality equilibrium due to cost differences can be illustrated using
Lemma 2(c) and Figure 1.  In Figure 1, an increase in bi would lead to a downward shift in qbri.  If
bi/bj gets sufficiently large, the intersection of qbri and qbrj in the northwest corner of Figure 3
vanishes.  Only one equilibrium with firm j providing high quality remains.
11 Recall that each firm's product quality is governed by the regulation of the country of origin,
regardless of destination.
24
                                                                                                                                                                                     
12 Note also that the RHS of equation (8) is positive at si = 0.  This means that a solution involving
only one firm in the market cannot be optimal.
13 The appropriate procedure has been presented earlier in Lutz (1996b).
14 If costs are identical or not too different, there exist two equilibria.  Under large cost differences,
only one equilibrium with the low-cost firm providing high quality remains.  Derivation is analogous
to that of unregulated equilibria.  See Section 2.3 and Footnote 8.
15 This analysis presented here is based on an earlier discussion paper version (Lutz 1996a).
16 The results in this case are independent of the degree of period-to-period discounting.  However, the
identity of the high-quality provider cannot be predetermined and may change from period to period,
i.e. leapfrogging of competitors is possible.
17 Given the form of the cost function, this implies that the same incremental quality increase each
period can be achieved with identical cost, but there are diminishing returns to increasing the speed of
quality improvement over time.
18 Knowledge spillovers between firms would be own cost reductions induced by the competitor’s
increase in quality.
19 With complete discounting, the model can be solved forward, starting with the static solution of
period 1 and so forth. With incomplete discounting the model would have to be solved backward
starting from the last period, which is, due to its complexity, beyond the scope of this paper.
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Table 1.  Results without Regulation
Period sh*) so*) PIh**) PIo**) Wh**) Wo**) W**)
0 0.253311 0.048238 0.048877 0.003055 0.092095 0.046273 0.138368
1 0.506622 0.096477 0.161921 0.008437 0.248357 0.094873 0.343230
2 0.759932 0.144715 0.274964 0.013818 0.404619 0.143473 0.548029
3 1.013243 0.192953 0.388008 0.019200 0.560881 0.192073 0.752954
4 1.266554 0.241192 0.501051 0.024582 0.717142 0.240673 0.957815
5 1.519865 0.289430 0.614095 0.029964 0.873404 0.289273 1.162677
6 1.773176 0.337668 0.727138 0.035345 1.029670 0.337873 1.367543
7 2.026490 0.385907 0.840182 0.040073 1.185930 0.386473 1.572403
8 2.279797 0.434145 0.953226 0.046109 1.342190 0.435073 1.777263
9 2.533110 0.482383 1.066270 0.051491 1.498450 0.483673 1.982123
10 2.786419 0.530622 1.179310 0.056872 1.654710 0.532273 2.186983
*) Multiply values with t2/b
**) Multiply values with t4/b
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Table 2.  Results with Quality Standards
Period sh*) so*) PIh**) PIo**) Wh**) Wo**) W**)
0 0.316249 0.100601 0.027247 0 0.092456 0.065210 0.157666
1 0.635173 0.253962 0.133581 0 0.280577 0.146996 0.427573
2 0.956819 0.442369 0.225395 0.002512 0.466669 0.243786 0.710455
3 1.280080 0.631688 0.317368 0.016204 0.654020 0.352856 1.006876
4 1.602410 0.821548 0.409774 0.029792 0.842186 0.462204 1.304390
5 1.927470 1.011740 0.500965 0.043432 1.029630 0.572097 1.601727
6 2.253070 1.202170 0.593642 0.057066 1.218770 0.682190 1.900960
7 2.579070 1.392770 0.686478 0.070699 1.408200 0.792426 2.200626
8 2.905410 1.583510 0.779431 0.084333 1.597870 0.902770 2.500640
9 3.232000 1.774340 0.872499 0.097969 1.787730 1.013200 2.800930
10 3.558800 1.965260 0.965646 0.111608 1.977730 1.123690 3.101420
*) Multiply values with t2/b
**) Multiply values with t4/b
